As global dynamics shift, nations are preparing for the future. The rise of renewable energy technologies, the vital role of batteries in modern economies, and the integration of critical minerals into contemporary defence systems have made secure, diversified supply chains of critical minerals an economic, strategic, and national security imperative globally. The problem is that this supply is currently dominated by the very state both Australian and U.S. government documents routinely accuse of engaging in ‘grey zone’ tactics.

Subsequently, the development of a reliable, allied critical minerals sector has become of primary concern to successive U.S. Governments, as evidenced by the first 100 days of President Trump’s administration where he floated the idea of annexing Greenland, a move widely seen as an effort to secure a supply of rare earths. Similarly, the White House has been eyeing Ukraine’s mineral wealth during its ongoing conflict with Russia, with proposals to link access to Ukraine’s critical minerals reserves to financial support packages.

With the rapidly shifting international order in mind, I spoke with two experts presenting at the Critical Minerals Investment Summit 2025, Clyde Russell from Thomson Reuters and Dr Vlado Vivoda director of the Strategic Minerals Advisory and Research consultancy and a professor at the University of Queensland. We discussed the current and future policies of the U.S. Government, their effect on Australia and Australian companies, and how both the public and private sector can best position themselves to gain an advantage in the Critical Minerals space.  

The current state of play for Australian critical minerals on the global stage

Firstly, what is the current state of play? Both interviewees agreed that much of the current framework shaping the Australian critical minerals market is a legacy of the Biden administration. Vivoda highlighted Biden’s emphasis on “strategic alliances and clean energy transition,” noting that the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which has served as a blueprint for Australia’s own “Future Made in Australia” policy, remains firmly in place. Russell put it more plainly, observing that “in effect, [current U.S.] policy allows Australian mining companies without Chinese links to access funding for projects.” 

But both were clear: U.S. policy is poised to evolve, and perhaps unpredictably. While neither anticipate a wholesale abandonment of the Australian opportunity in favour of outright resource nationalism, both pointed to an imminent “change of tone” and a more “transactional approach.” Russell suggested that Australia faces “an immense opportunity, if it can convince President Trump that he has to pay in order to secure a non-China supply of critical minerals.” Yet he also cautioned that the Trump administration might lean toward coercive tactics, “securing the supply by threatening to hurt Australia,” through the tariffs or strategic pressure currently favoured. Vivoda offered a slightly different perspective, predicting less a change in underlying strategic intent and more a shift in how deals are framed and executed, “from alliance-driven decarbonisation to security-first resource nationalism.” In his view, the U.S. will still look to Australia as a preferred partner, rather than a subordinate, for stable, aligned supply. 

What are the most pressing challenges facing Australian critical minerals?

Where do the challenges lie for Australian businesses? Both interviewees agreed that the central issue is simple but stubborn: who’s willing to pay for what? Russell was blunt “if the United States wants a critical minerals supply chain independent of China, it’s going to cost more.” He argued that if President Trump intends to prioritise national security through secure, non-Chinese mineral supplies, then Australian miners will need reliable access to U.S. funding and offtake agreements. But, he cautioned, “as with all things Trump, uncertainty is the defining characteristic.” There’s often a gap between what should happen and what actually does.

Vivoda shared similar concerns but was keen to first emphasise the upside. He noted that Australian critical minerals projects now enjoy heightened geopolitical visibility and market credibility. It’s not just the U.S. taking notice, “Japan, South Korea, and the EU see Australian supply as relatively low-risk in an increasingly polarised geopolitical landscape.” Australian projects meet ESG standards and are either approaching or already in production which makes them especially well positioned.

However, the challenge is increasingly pronounced. Vivoda pointed to Trump-era executive orders, like the 2020 directive prioritising domestic mining, reshoring, and U.S.-based value addition. If this policy direction resumes, and all signs suggest it might, Australian projects could find themselves in a difficult position: “seen as strategically vital, but not fully eligible for U.S. industrial support or incentives.” The result? A persistent mismatch between Australian project timelines and shifting U.S. political and bureaucratic priorities, creating uncertainty, slowing investment, and delaying the integration of Australian supply into U.S. value chains.

The shift in U.S. administration means there are specific incentives and restrictions that Australian companies need to navigate, but these could shift imminently. As Russell puts it, “It’s a watch this space thing at the moment.” 

Vivoda offered a more detailed look at the current landscape. He stressed the importance of the Inflation Reduction Act, particularly its eligibility rules for tax credits, describing it as a key piece of the puzzle for Australian businesses. He also pointed to opportunities through the DPA Title III program and the Department of Energy’s Loan Programs Office, but with a warning: “Australian companies need to understand how to structure programs to align with their mandates.” Finally, Vivoda highlighted the United States-Australia Climate, Critical Minerals and Clean Energy Transformation Compact, calling it “more than just symbolism.” He was careful to frame it as a potential foundation for future cooperation, noting it “could pave the way for deeper project support or supply chain integration.”

The future of demand for Australian critical minerals

When asked about the future of U.S. critical minerals demand and what that could mean for Australia over the next five years, both interviewees offered measured, cautious views. Russell was clear that while the U.S. need is obvious, whether it translates into meaningful investment remains uncertain. “The need for critical minerals doesn’t necessarily translate into a desire to pay for them,” he warned. Vivoda echoed this, noting that “U.S. demand for materials including lithium, rare earths, nickel and cobalt will continue to grow rapidly,” and that “Australia is well positioned to meet this demand.” However, he argued this won’t be achieved through “just targeted joint ventures or modest investments.” Instead, it requires “strategic government intervention” and a scale of policy ambition, coordination and execution that, as he put it, “matches the scale of the geopolitical and economic stakes.”

What the geopolitical landscape ahead means for Australian critical minerals

I wrapped up our conversation by asking both interviewees to look beyond formal policy settings and consider how U.S. soft power might shape where countries source, invest in, or partner on critical minerals projects, and what this would mean for Australia. Here, Russell and Vivoda offered slightly different perspectives.

Russell was direct, arguing that “the lasting legacy of Trump’s second term may be the erosion of U.S. soft power and influence.” He echoed a sentiment recently voiced by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who warned it would be difficult if those “whose motto is not ‘America First,’ but ‘America Alone’” prevail. That said, Russell doesn’t see this as entirely negative for Australia. “The likely response is that countries will become more transactional in dealing with Trump, and those who hold the best cards will come out on top.” He looks to us to make bold decisions stating, “Australia is in in pole position here, all it needs is the courage to play the cards.” 

Vivoda took a broader geopolitical view, noting that U.S. strategic influence is “reshaping global perceptions of risk and trust.” Even in the absence of formal policy, he argued, Washington’s signalling alone carries weight, driving investors and sovereign wealth funds toward U.S.-aligned projects. “Australia must now navigate a more complex geopolitical landscape where alignment with the U.S. enhances opportunity but also comes with greater scrutiny and responsibility,” Vivoda concluded.

I leave these conversations with some certainties, and some unresolved questions. What’s clear is that critical minerals are no longer a luxury or niche commodity, they’re a strategic necessity, and global demand will only accelerate in the years and decades ahead. It’s also evident that in an increasingly multipolar world, many Western governments may need to temporarily set aside orthodox liberal-capitalist ideals in favour of bold, interventionist policy, or risk remaining in a position where China controls the supply of minerals deemed essential to national security and economic resilience.

For Australia, this moment presents a significant opportunity. Our established mining expertise, stable regulatory environment and longstanding diplomatic relationships position us as a natural partner for the United States as it seeks to diversify away from Chinese-dominated supply chains. Yet both experts made it clear that as the U.S. wrestles with its own political character and strategic priorities, Australia remains somewhat in the dark about precisely where it stands immediately and in the future.

The U.S. market offers enormous potential for Australian critical minerals, but it’s a complex, shifting landscape that will require careful navigation from project leaders, investors and policymakers alike.

Connect with and hear from 25+ expert speakers, including Clyde Russell and Dr Vlado Vivoda, at the Critical Minerals Investment Summit 2025, from 23-24 July 2025, in Perth. Learn more. 

To access the detailed conference program, download the brochure here.